# IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA

Jerome Curry,	) C/A No. 0:10-2823-HFF-PJG
Plaintiff,	) )
v.	) ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
The Charleston County Detention Center; Officer Pool; Officer Smith; Officer Mack,	) ) )
Defendants.	) )

The plaintiff, Jerome Curry ("Plaintiff"), proceeding *pro* se, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This matter is before the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) DSC. Plaintiff is a pretrial detainee at the Charleston County Detention Center, and files this action *in forma pauperis* under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. The Plaintiff appears to name several employees of the detention center as defendants in his Complaint and alleges that an incident of excessive force and denial of food for one week violated his constitutional rights. Plaintiff seeks money damages and injunctive relief. Having reviewed the Complaint in accordance with applicable law, the court concludes that the defendant "The Charleston County Detention Center" should be dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted.

### PRO SE AND IN FORMA PAUPERIS REVIEW

Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the *pro* se complaint pursuant to the procedural provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915, 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, and the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996). This review has been conducted in light of the following

precedents: <u>Denton v. Hernandez</u>, 504 U.S. 25 (1992); <u>Neitzke v. Williams</u>, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989); <u>Haines v. Kerner</u>, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); <u>Nasim v. Warden</u>, <u>Md. House of Corr.</u>, 64 F.3d 951 (4th Cir. 1995) (*en banc*); <u>Todd v. Baskerville</u>, 712 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1983).

The Complaint has been filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit. To protect against possible abuses of this privilege, the statute allows a district court to dismiss the case upon a finding that the action "fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted," "is frivolous or malicious," or "seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). A finding of frivolousness can be made where the complaint "lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact." Denton, 504 U.S. at 31. Hence, under § 1915(e)(2)(B), a claim based on a meritless legal theory may be dismissed *sua sponte*. Neitzke, 490 U.S. 319; Allison v. Kyle, 66 F.3d 71 (5th Cir. 1995).

This court is required to liberally construe *pro se* complaints. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Such *pro se* complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys, <u>id.;Gordon v. Leeke</u>, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978), and a federal district court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a *pro se* litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. <u>Hughes v. Rowe</u>, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980); <u>Cruz v. Beto</u>, 405 U.S. 319 (1972). When a federal court is evaluating

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>Screening pursuant to § 1915A is subject to this standard as well.

a *pro se* complaint, the plaintiff's allegations are assumed to be true. <u>Erickson</u>, 551 U.S. at 93 (citing <u>Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly</u>, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007)).

Nonetheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009) (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for "all civil actions"). The mandated liberal construction afforded to *pro se* pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so; however, a district court may not rewrite a complaint to include claims that were never presented, Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128 (10th Cir. 1999), construct the plaintiff's legal arguments for him, Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411 (7th Cir. 1993), or "conjure up questions never squarely presented" to the court, Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).

## **DISCUSSION**

This Complaint is filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which "is not itself a source of substantive rights," but merely provides 'a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'" Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 allows "a party who has been deprived of a federal right under the color of state law to seek relief." City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 707 (1999).

The Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted as to the defendant "The Charleston County Detention Center." To state a claim for damages under



42 U.S.C. § 1983, an aggrieved party must allege: (1) that he or she was injured; (2) by the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States; (3) by a person acting under color of state law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. "The Charleston County Detention Center" is not a "person" within the meaning of § 1983. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 690 & n.55 (1978) (noting that for purposes of § 1983 a "person" includes individuals and "bodies politic and corporate"); see generally 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1230 (2002). The Detention Center consists of buildings, facilities, and grounds—inanimate objects that do not act under color of state law—and thus is not a "person" within the meaning of §1983. See Preval v. Reno, 57 F. Supp. 2d 307, 310 (E.D. Va.1999) ("[T]he Piedmont Regional Jail is not a 'person,' and therefore not amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983."), rev'd on other grounds 2000 WL 20591, \*1 (4th Cir. 2000) (unpublished) ("The court also properly determined that the Piedmont Regional Jail is not a "person" and is therefore not amenable to suit under § 1983."); Brooks v. Pembroke City Jail, 722 F. Supp. 1294, 1301 (E.D.N.C.1989) ("Claims under § 1983 are directed at 'persons' and the jail is not a person amenable to suit."). Therefore, the defendant "The Charleston County Detention Center" should be summarily dismissed from this action without prejudice and without service of process.

#### RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, the court recommends that the Defendant "The Charleston County Detention Center" be dismissed in the above-captioned case without prejudice and without issuance and service of process. <u>See Neitzke v. Williams</u>, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989); <u>Haines v. Kerner</u>, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (as soon as possible after

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docketing, district courts should review prisoner cases to determine whether they are subject to summary dismissal). This action will proceed against Defendants Pool, Smith, and Mack.<sup>2</sup>

Paige J. **G**ossett

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

December 1, 2010 Columbia, South Carolina

The Plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Contemporaneously with this Report and Recommendation, this Court entered an Order authorizing service of process upon Defendants Pool, Smith, and Mack.

## Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation

The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must 'only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation." Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).

Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:

Larry W. Propes, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201

Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).